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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST.ATE OF U'TAH 
A. E. UPTON, 
App·ellant, 
-vs.-
HEISELT CONSTRUCTIO·N COM-
PANY, L. H. HEISELT and ANNIE 
RAY HEISELT, Administratrix of 
the Estate of L. H. HEIS.ELT, 
Deceased, 
Respon,dent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 8240 
STATEMENT OF' THE CASE 
Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the record. 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
The Staternent of the case by plaintiff is prolix and 
there are son1e inaccuracies. The factual situation here 
presented is very simple. 
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Defendant's decedent, L. H. Heiselt, n1oved to stay 
execution on the judgment rendered against hin1 on the 
ground that he ha;d ·been discharged in bankruptcy (Sup-
plemental Record). Thereafter, as ad1ninistratrix of his 
estate, defendant was substituted as a party defendant 
( 16). The trial court granted the n1otion and stayed ex-
ecution (74, 75). 
D·ecedent filed his petition in bankruptcy October 
23, 1940 and a schedule of his debts was filed at ~that time. 
(Ex. 1-A) Defendant admits that decedent's liability on 
the note for which the judgment was obtained was not 
scheduled hut -contends plaintiff had "notice or actual 
knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy" within time 
to file the claim. 
Judgment against decedent was rendered June 19, 
1948, on his endorser's liability on a note due May 15, 
1937, the a-ction having been commenced June 9, 1943. The 
note wa.s secured by mor~tgage and the maker and the 
n1ortgage were discharged because of the statute· of limi-
tations. 
Decedent was dis·charged in bankruptcy J'anuary 14, 
1949. 
We wi'll go into neces'Sary factual detail as we answer 
each of plaintiff's points in the 01~der they appear in his 
brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
P·OINT I. 
THE UTAH COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTROVERSY IS NOT RES JUDICATA. 
1. Where ju,dgment is obtained against a bankrupt 
between the time of his adjudication and his dischar.qe 
on a debt in existen,ce before adjudication, the debt and 
judgment are discharged even though he did not assert 
his adjudication and request a stay before judgment 
obtained. 
2. Proceedings in the Ba,nkruptcy Court in Colorado 
are not res judicata of proceedings now before the court. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF DECED-
ENT'S PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY WITHIN THE 
PERIOD ALLOWED FOR THE FILING OF CLAIMS AND 
HENCE HIS CLAIM WAS BARRED BY DECEDENT'S DIS-
CHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED 
WAS A PROVABLE DEBT. 
ARGUMENT 
P·OINT I. 
THE UTAH COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION. 
No formal action has been filed in the Colorado courts 
(23). Defendant adrninistratrix testified that plaintiff 
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filed the clain1 based on the judgn1ent here involved \Yith 
the probate court in Conejos County, Colorado. She 
denied the claim (21, 22), and no further steps have been 
taken to have the claim judicially determined. 
Plaintiff's position is that the Utah Courts do not 
have jurisdiction beeause proceedings have been c.on1-
menced in Colorado. He did not attempt to obtain a stay 
of the Utah proceedings until the claim was judicially 
determined in Colorado, but filed a motion to strike the 
Application for Substitution filed by defendant admin-
istratrix (15) asserting lack of jurisdiction. 
The rule applicable here is stated in 21 C.J.S. 855, 
Courts, S.ection 548: 
"The p~endency of an action in the courts of 
one state or eountry is not a bar to the institution 
of another action between the same parties and 
for the same cause of action in a court of another 
state or eountry, nor is it the duty of the court 
in which the latter action is brought to stay the 
same pending a determination of the earlier 
action, even though the court in which the earlier 
action is brought has jurisdiction sufficient to 
dispose of the entire controversy." 
The authorities cited by plaintiff express the rule 
applicable to courts of the same state. 
14 Am. Jur. 440, Courts, Section 246, after stating 
the rule quoted by plaintiff, states: 
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"One of the apparent exceptions to the rule 
that the court first acquiring jurisdiction must 
be permitte:a to exercise it to the end arises wh.en 
a person suing in one state subsequently begins 
an action for the same matter and against the 
same parties in another state, or in one of the 
national courts, or when, after first resorting 
to a national court, he subsequently institutes an 
action in a state court. In either ease it is pro-
bably true that the court first acquiring juris-
diction must proceed to a final determination of 
the controversy, 'and yet it is at least equally 
true that the court last resorted to 1nay also pro-
ceed. While in such a case the suits may proceed 
concurrently, still the judg1nent first rendered 
may be pleaded in bar of any further mainten-
ance of the other suit." 
Tlie subject of stay of civil proceedings pending 
deter1nination of an action in another state is annotated 
in 19 A.L.R. 2d 301. It is there recognized that the courts 
of each state may have jurisdiction of the same cause. 
After stating the rule relating to courts of the same state 
relied on by plaintiff, the annotator states: 
"* * * This principle, however, does not 
hold true in the case of a pending action in 
another jurisdiction, it being uniformly held that 
the pendency of another action in another juris-
diction, though between the same parties and 
upon the same cause of action as the one sub-
sequently instituted at the forum, is not a bar or 
ground for the abatement of the later 'action at 
the forum. This is true even though the foreign 
court in which the prior action was commenced 
had complete jurisdiction of the parties and of 
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the action. See 1 Am Jur, Abaten1ent and R.ev-
ival § 39. And the two suits may proceed until 
judgment is rendered in one of them, which judg-
ment may then he pleaded in bar in the other." 
The plaintiff here did not seek a stay of proceedings 
but sought an outright dismissal. But it would h'ave been 
\vithin the discretion of the trial court to deny a stay 
herein even if it were requested. 
The Utah judgment is the source, so to speak, of 
plaintiff's claim. Defendant administratrix seeks to dry 
up the claim at its source. Courts are hesitant about 
annulling or holding for naught judg1nents of another 
state, 21 C.J.S. 858, Cou~ts, Section 552. The Utah court 
having held its judgment discharged by bankruptcy and 
having permanently stayed execution, defendant will be 
~ble to establish this in any court where plaintiff may 
seek to enforce the judgment. Defendant will be able to 
rely on the decision of a Utah Court concerning its own 
judgment and will not have to rely, if she could, upon a 
decision of a foreign court. 
The reme:dy here obtained by defendant is recognized 
by all authorities. 
21 Am. Jur. 292, Executions, Section 604 states: 
"* * * A stay of execution is also available 
where the judgment debtor has been releived 
fro~ the .judgment through the operation of pro-
ceedings In bankruptcy or insolvency." 
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As indicated by 7 Remington on Bankruptcy 743, 
Sec. 3488: 
"After the discharge is gran ted the juris-
diction of the Bankruptcy Court to stay ceases, 
for thenceforth the bankrupt must obtain his 
rights under the discharge from the court where-
in he is sued." 
See 6 Arn. Jur. (Rev. Ed.) 740, Bankruptcy, Section 
313, vvherein it is sta:ted: 
"~Iany state courts recognize a discharge in 
bankruptcy as a ground for a perpetual stay of 
execution on a judgment taken against the bank-
rupt upon a dischargeable debt." 
In 6 Aut. J1tr. (Rev. Ed.) 987, Bankruptcy, Section 
753, it is stated: 
"A stay of execution on a discharge judg-
ment is a proper remedy to effectuate the dis-
charge." 
We subrnit the Utah Courts had jurisdiction and that 
the plaintiff's l\Iotion to Strike was properly denied. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTROVERSY IS NOT RES JUDICATA. 
Under his second point plaintiff presents two propo-
sitions: 
That the judgrnent entered in this case is final in 
the sense that defendant cannot now interpose decedent's 
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discharge in bankruptcy bec.ause he failed to assert 
the adjudication in the trial of the la-\vsuit resulting in 
that judg1nent; 
That c:ertain proceedings taken in the bankruptcy 
court involved this controversy and hence has already 
been decided adversely to defendant. 
We will answer plaintiff's second point under the 
following two headings: 
1. Where judgment is obtained against a bankrupt 
between the time of his adjudication and his discharge 
on a debt in existence before aajudication, the debt and 
judgment are discharged even though he did not assert 
his adjudication and request a stay before judgment 
obtained. 
2. Proceedings in the bankruptcy court in Colorado 
are not res judicata of proceedings now before the court. 
1. Where jud.gment is obtained aga,inst a bankrupt 
betw-een the time of his .adjudication and his dischar.qe 
on a debt in Bxistence before adjud;ication, the debt and 
judgmen.t are discharged even though he did not assert 
his adjuidication and request a stay before judgment 
obtained. 
Defendant's decedent prior to judgn1ent in the pres-
ent case did not assert his adjudication or request a stay 
thereunder to p·revent further proceedings. He had ob-
tained his adjudication in bankruptcy July 7, 1941. This 
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action was con1menced July 9, 1943 on a debt which was 
due ~lay, 1937. Judgment vvas eventually entered against 
hirn June 15, 1948. He obtained his discharge in bank-
ruptcy January 14, 1949. 
It, therefore, conclusively appears that the judgment 
vvas obtained before discharge and under the cases, it 
\vas entirely up to the bankrupt whether or not he would 
assert his adjudication of bankruptcy to obtain a stay. 
The cases hold that since this is rnerely a privilege grant-
ed to the bankrupt, he may assert it or waive it as he sees 
fit and it will have no effect on the ultimate discharge 
of the judgment so long as the discharge in bankruptcy 
cornes subsequent to the entry of judgment. The import-
ant event is the discharge in bankruptcy. If that has been 
obtained before judg1nent, then, of eourse, he would have 
lost his right to assert the discharge as a release of the 
obligation. However, that is not the ease at bar because 
tlie judgment here was obtained before decedent obtained 
his discharge in bankruptcy. 
This matter has been specifically ruled upon by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Boyn-
ton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 30 L. Ed. 985, 7 S. Ct. 981, 984. 
This case was decided in 1887, but is still the law and the 
relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act are substantially 
the same. In that case the judgment was. obtained after 
the defendant had been adjudicated a bankrupt and be-
fore his discharge in bankruptcy, just as in the C\1Se at 
bar. The court held that the judgment was the same debt 
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that it 'vas before judgment and notwithstanding its 
change in form, it still was discharged. Contention was 
1nade by plaintiff that the bankrupt had waived his right 
to claim discharge by his failure to call to the court's at-
tention the ·adjudication and to secure a stay of further 
proceedings in order to prevent plaintiff from obtaining 
a judgment. The court overruled this contention of plain-
tiff and held that defendant had not waived his right to 
assert the discharge when eventually it was obtained. 
The court stated: 
"* * * The whole· section is also clearly in1-
pressed with the idea that this is a provision pri-
marily for the benefit of the bankrupt, that he may 
be enabled to 'avoid being harassed in both courts 
at the same time with regard to such debt. It is 
therefore a right which he may waive. He may be 
willing that the suit shall proceed in the state 
court for many reasons, -first, because he is not 
sure that he will ever obtain his discharge from 
the court in bankruptcy, in which c:a'se it would-do 
him no good to delay the proceedings at his ex-
pense in th'e state court; in the second place, he 
may have a defense in the state court which he is 
quite willing to rely upon there, and to have the 
issue tried; in the thir'd place, he may he very 
willing to have th-e amount in dispute liquidated 
in that proceeding, in which case it becomes a debt 
to be paid pro rata with his other aebts by the 
assignee in bankruptcy. 
"If for any of these reasons or for others, 
he permits the cas:e to p·roceed to judgment in the 
stat~ court, by failing to procure a stay of pro-
ceedings under the provisions, of this section of 
the bankrupt law, or the 'assignee in bankruptcy 
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does not intervene as he may do, (Hill v. Hard-
ing, 107 U.S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404), he does not 
thereby forfeit his right to plead his final dis-
charge in bankruptcy, if he shall obtain it a.t any 
appropriate stage of the proc.eedings against him 
in the state court. And if, as in the present case, 
hrs final discharge is not obtained until after 
judgment has been rendered against him in the 
state court, he ma.y produce that discharge to the 
state court, and obtain the stay of execution which 
he asks for now. See McDougald v. Reid, 5 Ala. 
810. 
"In Rogers v. Western Marine Fire Ins. Co., 
1 La. Ann. 161, the court, in a similar case says: 
'The proposition that Rogers should have pleaded 
the pendency of the bankrupt proceedings in the 
original suit, and cannot disturb the execution of 
the judgment which is final, rs untenable. The 
discharge in bankruptcy was posterior to th·e ren-
dition of this judgment, and operated with the 
S'ame force upon the debt after it assumed the 
form of a judgment as it would have done had the 
debt rem~ained in its original form of a promis-
story note.' " 
More recent cases to the saine ·effect are Badger v. 
Jorda.n Ma.rsh Co. 7 256 Mass. 153, 152 N.E. 92; Hamilton 
1_:. First State Bank7 57 N. Dak. 143, 220 N.W. 644; Yale 
University v. Wei'ssman 7 296 Mass. 23'9, 5 N.E. 2d 444. 
The rule is stated in 6 Am. J1tr. (Rev. Ed.) 738, Bank-
ruptcy, 'Se-c. 309 : 
"The right of the bankrupt to the stay of a 
suit pending against him at the time of the filing 
of the petition in bankruptcy may be waived. A 
bankrupt does not, by failing to assert his right 
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to a stay, p-reclude himself thereafte~-- from ple~d­
ing his discharge in bankruptcy against the claim 
'a'Sserte:d in th·e suit. If the discharge of the bank-
rupt is not obtained until after judg1nent has been 
rendered against him in the state court on an ac-
tion pending at the time of the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, he may then assert the discharge 
as a defense to the enforcement of such judgment 
and obtain a stay of execution." 
Also see 1 Collier on· Bankruptcy, 14th Ed. 1670, 
Section 17.32, wherein the rule is stated as follows: 
"If the suit ha.s not been stayed, and a judg-
Inent is entered P'rior to the award of a discharge, 
the discharge, when obtained, may be availed of 
as a har to further remedies on the judgment." 
See also 6 An~. Ju.r. (Rev. Ed.) 739, Bankruptcy, Sec-
tion 309. 
Th.e authorities cited by plaintiff are not ap·plicable 
to the ease at bar where the judgment was obtained prior 
to di1scharge. 
We have no quarrel with such authorities as 6 Am. 
Jur. (Rev. Ed.) 743, Bankruptcy, S·ec. 319, to the effect 
that an application n1ay be made to a state court for stay 
of proceedings based upon the adjudication in bankruptcy 
se·eking to have th.at court stay proceedings until the 
discharge may be obtained. While the bankrupt 1nay seek 
such a stay, he need not do so. As pointed out in the 
Boynton case, there are a number of reasons he may have 
for desiring to proceed with the litigation. The obvious 
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one in the present case is that decedent believed he had 
a defense to the cause of action and plaintiff should not 
be permitted to obtain a judg1nent if it could be pre-
vented. 
We are not interested in vvhat is the normal or the 
safe practice in connection with the pleading of an adjudi-
cation, as referred to in 6 Am. Jur. (Rev. Ed.) 1025, 
Bankruptcy, Sec. 807. The simple proposition presented 
is vvhether or not a prior judgment is released by a sub-
sequent discharge. 
\\T e do not dispute the proposition that a discharge 
in bankruptcy must he pleaded in order to be a defense 
as ruled in Helrns v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 141 A.L.R. 
1367. That case was an action to enjoin enforcement of a 
judgment obtained against plaintiff. A discharge in 
bankruptcy had been secured by plaintiff before the judg-
Inent had been entered. The court held that this dis-
charge was a defense and that it must be pleaded to re-
leaS'e the debt. L: pon failure to plead it before judgment, 
defendant could not thereafter raise it in proceedings 
such as he had here commenced. This obviously is not 
the situation where judgment is obtained before dis-
charge. Until the discharge is obtained it cannot be 
vleaded. 
Parker v. ~1 urphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N .E. 85, vva.s an 
application for an extraordinary writ of au,dita querela. 
Plaintiff's own state1nent of the case conclusively estab-
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lishes that it is not in point and the court decided the debt 
\vas not discharged because it had not been scheduled and 
the creditor did not have notice or actual knowledge of 
th'e bankruptcy pToceedings. 
Berry Clothing Co. v. Shotnick, 249 Mass. 459, 144 
N.E. 392, is not in p:oint. The action was against a surety 
on an attachment bond. Defendant ~surety contended the 
judgment in the c:ase where the attachment bond was filed 
was void because it had been entered after the defend-
ants there had filed a suggestion of an adjudication in 
bankruptcy an'd a -certified copy of the adjudication. The 
court held the judgment valid on the ground that the 
Bankruptcy Act did not require a court to grant a stay 
and in any event the defendants there did not follow c'Or-
rect practice in calling the adjudication to the court's 
attention. 
This ease holds, as applied here, that even though 
decedent ha~d pleaded the adjudication the Utah Court 
would nnt have been required to stay proce·edings but 
could have continued to judgment. 
In Woodruff v. Heiser, 150 F:. 2d 869 (10 CCA) a 
creditor presented 'a claim based on a California judg-
n1ent to the referee. Previously the trustee in bankruptcy 
had unsuccessfully moved in the C'alifornia -courts to set 
aside· this judgment. The referee di'Sallowed the claim 
on the ground he eould go into the validity of the judg-
Inen t. The district court reversed. The circuit court re-
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yersed the district court. The supreme court, 327 U.S. 
7~6, 66 S. Ct. 853, 90 L. Ed. 970, reversed the circuit 
court. The ultimate holding was that the validity of the 
judgment had been determined in the California proceed-
ings to set it aside. No problem of adjudication or dis-
charge was in any way involved. 
We respectfully submit that it vvas unnecessary for 
defendant to assert the adjudication in order to rely upon 
the discharge obtained after judgment and that there-
fore defendant's 1notion to stay execution was properly 
granted. 
2. Proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court in Colorado 
are not res judicata of proceed:ings now before the court. 
Plaintiff contends that by two separate proceedings 
eornmenced in the Federal District Court for the District 
of Colorado in bankruptcy the matters here involved have 
already been determined. His contention is that the Fed-
eral Di'strict Court has held the debt upon which the 
judgment \vas obtained herein and the judgment herein 
\Vere not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding. It 
is the contention of defendant administratrix that those 
proceedings had nothing to do with the discharge of the 
debt and judgrnent involved in this case and that the 
court's rulings in those cases were based upon the propo-
sition that the Bankruptcy Court was not interested 
in the controversy and had no jurisdiction. 
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The first of these proceedings was commenced Oc-
tober 28 1947 and rs embodied in Exhibits 2-A (pages 
' 
.16-23 inc.) and 4. The second was conrmenced March 6, 
1951 and is en1bodied in Exhibits A, B and 3-A. 
Plaintiff and decedent resorted to the Utah· Courts 
to have two controversies decided. The first was the 
case at bar. Plaintiff sued on a note and 1nortgage. The 
defendants were the maker of the note and mortgage 
(Hei'selt Construction Comp·any) and decedent, the en-
dorser. The property mortgaged was owned by the com-
p-any and the mortga~ge was not foreclosed. Personal 
judgment was entered against decedent and this is the 
judginent here involved. This controversy was decided 
in 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945. 
Plaintiff also sought to quiet title to certain land 
located in Salt Lake County. Decedent, the ahove com-
pany and other's were defendants. Ultin1ate decision in 
this may be found in 118 Utah 573, 223 P. 2d 428. 
Consideration of these two bankruptcy p-roce·edings 
will demonstrate that they liave nothing to do with the 
proposition of whether or not the discharge in bank-
ruptcy is effective against the ju{lg1nent in the case at 
bar. 
In the first proceeding the effectiveness of the dis-
charge could not possibly have been in issue or raised 
because the discharge was not even in existence. It \vas 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
entered January 1-l-, 1949. This proceeding \Vas com-
Inenced October 28, 1947, one year and two 1non ths be-
fore and was decided ~1arch 15, 1948. Hence, decedent 
did not at any ti1ne during this proceeding have a defense 
to his liability as endorser on the note by reason of a 
di:::;charge in bankruptcy. 
Decedent asked the Bankruptcy Court to declare null 
and void the note and mortgage upon which the judgment 
here was based and to restrain plaintiff from further pro-
ceedings thereunder. Decedent alleged that plaintiff, 
Peterson and decedent entered into a partnership and the 
note and mortgage was in fact without any consideration 
and \Vas made merely for the purpose of protecting plain-
tiff and Peterson in case of claims against the Heiselt 
Construction Company. The partnership was operating 
in the name of this cornpany. This is the basis on which 
plaintiff clai1ned the note and n1ortgage was null and 
void. Decedent also alleged that notwithstanding the pro-
visions of Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act plaintiff had 
filed an action in the State of Utah seeking to foreclose 
the rnortgage. This was apparently the basis upon which 
he asked the Bankruptcy Court to restrain further pro-
ceedings upon the mortgage (Ex. 2-A, pp. 18, 19). 
Decedent in those proceedings also asserted that the 
plaintiff haJd wrongfully taken possession of real estate 
and personal property by virtue of a tax deed, said prop-
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erty being located in Salt Lake C'Ounty. He sought to 
have the Bankruptcy Court require plaintiff to deliver 
this property to him (Ex. 2-A, pp. 19-21). 
In response to the petition, plaintiff filed a motion 
to dis1nis's. The fundamental basis of this motion was the 
lack ·of jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court. The plain-
tiff asserted that the court had no jurisdiction over the 
Heiselt Construction Company, the maker of the note and 
1nortgage. Plaintiff also pointed out that the court had 
no juris·diction to determine the matter set forth in the 
petition but that the matters were for determination by 
a court "of plenary jurisdiction." Plaintiff asserted that 
the matters alleged in the petition amounted to a contro-
versy between the parties and that the parties were en-
titled to a trial by jury and that such a trial could not be 
had in the Bankruptcy C'ourt (Ex. 2-A, pp. 22, 23). With-
out considering the merits the Bankruptcy Court granted 
plaintiff's motion on jurisdictional grounds. The holding 
of the Bankruptcy Court is set forth on pages 5 and 6 of 
Exhibit 4. It therein c'oncludes: 
"The debtor seeks to have this Bankruptcy 
Court, in 'said ·section 75 proceeding of a farmer 
to adjudicate the rights bet\veen the sai(l debtor 
and the respondent, A. E. Upton, and to enter 
judgment therein adjudicating the rights of the 
parties. 
' 4 Th~ f~cts. do not warrant the n1aking of any 
such adJUdleation, or the entering of any such 
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judgn1ent in this proceeding. Bankruptcy courts 
are not trial courts, and if they were, these con tro-
versies \Vere pending in other courts. 
• 'The petition must be dis1nissed without con-
sideration of the merits. 
"CONCLUSION: It is, therefore, ORDER·-
ED, .CONSIDER.ED, AND ADJUD(fED, that the 
Inotion of the respondent, A. E. Upton, to the 
juris1diction of the Bankruptcy Court to have the 
facts herein determined on the issue therein 
stated, must be sustained and that conclusion re-
quires that the said petition be dismissed. 
"The petition of thEt debtor is, therefore, dis-
Inissed. 
"Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 15th day of 
~larch, 1948." 
'l1hus it appears clearly and conclusively from the 
order of the Bankruptcy Court that it refused to take 
jurisdiction of the claims therein presented anid dismissed 
the_ bankrupt's petition "'vi thou t consideration of the 
1nerits." 
In the second proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court in 
Colorado, the bankrupt filed a Petition to Reopen after 
his discharge had been granted and the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings had been closed. The prayer of the petition fur-
ther asks that until the further order of the court plain-
tiff herein be enjoined and restrained fron1 selling or 
other\vise disposing of the property involved in the quiet 
title action. Neither the. note nor the mortgage nor the 
property covered by the mortgage was even mentioned 
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in this petition. Thereafter, a hearing was held and the 
Con1plaint Ans,ver Counterclaiin, Findings of Fact, 
' ' Conclusions of Law anid Judgment entered in the case at 
bar were ad1nited in evidence. For what pu.rpose it does 
not appear. Fro1n the petition it conclusively appears 
that the only purpose of these proceedings was to have 
the B~ankruptcy Court determine that this, tax de·ed prop-
erty was an asset of the bankrupt's estate. The bankrupt 
sought to have the court ·determine this question adverse-
ly to the ju!dgrnent entered against him in plaintiff's ac-
tion to quiet title brought in the Utah Courts. It is ob-
vious from all of these proceedings, as -contained in Ex-
hibit A, B, and 3-A, th~at the bankrupt did not seek any 
adjudication of the question of "vhether or not the debt 
and judgment here involved were· discharged by bank-
rup~tcy. 
The plaintiff appeared in the proceedings and moved 
to ·dismiss the p·etition on the ground that the court lackeld 
jurisdiction over the subject Inatter and over the parties. 
The sp.ecial master recom1nended that the Petition to re-
open the case be denied and the court ordered that the 
Petition to reopen be denied in conforn1ity \Vith such rec-
ommendation (Ex. A, p. 11, Ex. B). 
The Bankruptcy Court made no finding or holding 
concerning the note or judgment here involved. The com-
Inission in quoting Collier on Bankruptcy was merely 
pointing out that any stay in the bankruptcy proceedings 
was judicial and not autom~atic, and if the bankrupt de-
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sired to take advantage of the stay he would have to as-
sert it. The court was not referring to the discharge or 
its effect and there is no 1nention made of the discharge 
in all of these proceedings and the application of that dis-
charge \vas in no way involved in the proceedings nlen-
tioned. The court concluded that plaintiff had not vio-
lated any of the provisions of the stay since it had ex-
pired in September of 19'44 and that the reopening of the 
ease \vould not benefit the debtor and that the determina-
tion of his rights to the Utah property by tax deed or 
otherwise \vas not involved within the date of the stay 
order. It \vas recon1mended that the application of the 
debtor to reopen the case be denied (Ex. A, pp·. 10, 11). 
At page 30 of his brief plaintiff asserts that by deny-
ing decedent's petition to reopen the bankruptcy proceed-
ings it \Vas "thereby implied th.at L. H. I-Ieiselt, by reason 
of his failure to schedule the indebtedness due the plain-
tiff was stopped fron1 further procedure before the Bank-
ruptcy Court, because the 1J tah Court's jurisdiction had 
attached." Just h·ow this could be implied we are at a 
total loss to know. The court was very explicit in its 
reasons for denying both of decedent's petitions and in 
none of these was any determination Inade or could it 
have been that decedent's debt to plaintiff was either 
discharged or not discharged in bankruptcy. 
We subn1it that there is no sh.owing in any of these 
proceedings that the Bankruptcy Court was either asked 
to or did or could rule upon the question of whether or 
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not the ·debt and judgn1ent here involved ",.ere discharged 
in bankruptcy and lienee there is. no doctrine of res judi-
cata \vhich \vould prevent defendant ad1ninistratrix 
fron1 asserting decedent'~s discharge in bankruptcy 
against the judgrnent obtained in this case. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF DECED-
ENT'S PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY WITHIN THE 
PERIOD ALLOWED FOR THE FILING OF CLAIMS AND 
HENCE HIS CLAIM WAS BARRED BY DECEDENT'S DIS-
CHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
The trial court found the obligation in this case \vas 
not schedule·d ( 70 - Finding I\T). This \vas not fatal to 
final discharge from the obligation. The discharge re-
leases the debt if the creditor "had notice or actual kno\vl-
edge of the proceedings in bankruptcy." 11 U.S.C.A. Sec-
tion 35 (a) ( 3). This knovvledge should be received by 
the creditor within the tin1e allowed for filing clain1s. 
The following authorities sustain the Hbove state-
n1ents of law applicable here: Harris -v. B,utler, 91 Utah 
11, 63 P. 2d 286 ( 1936) ; Birke.tt v. Columbia Bank, 195 
U.S. 3±5, 25 s .. Ct. 38, 49 L. Ed. 231 (1904); Blankenship 
v. Oakley, 57 Cal. App. 2d 563, 134 P. 2d 863 (1943); Ray 
v. Schubach, 10 Cal. App. 2d 122, 50 P. 2d 1073 (1933): 
In re Beerman, 112 Fed. 66·2 (1901); Zinunernzan 1~. 
Ketchum, 66 Kan. 98, 71 Pac. 264 (1903); Westall v. 
Jackson, 218 N.C. 209, 10 S.E. 2d 674; Bank of Rothz;illt 
v. Z.aleuke, 221 Mo. App. 1051, 295 S.W. 520; Bell v. 
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Georgia. Chenzical W arks, 33 Ga. App. 286, 125 S.E. 871; 
Bank of lVrightsville v. Four Seasons, 21 Ga. App. 453, 
9± S.E. G-!9; Gurewitz v. Wise, 122 ~I e. 4±4, 120 A. 536; 
~-~?ine c. Layden (Tex.) 91 S.W. 2d 983; In re Fischer, 274 
~.Y. Supp. 413. 
The bankrupt filed his original Petition in Bank-
ruptcy on October 23, 1940, and on N ove1nber 16, 1940, 
the Bankruptcy Court issued the '~Notice of First Meet-
ing of Creditors" setting the first date of the first Ineet-
ing of creditors as Decernber 21, 1940 ( 70). Under the 
la'v creditors then had until June 21, 1941 within which 
to file their claims. 11 U.S.C.A., Section 93 (n). 
~rhe contention of defendant is that on at least three 
occasions prior to June 21, 1941 plaintiff received actual 
kno\vledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Plaintiff devotes space in his brief contending that 
the burden of proof was upon defendant to show actual 
kno\vledge by plaintiff of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
\V e agree that this is the law. flowever, on appeal the 
question to be deter1nined is whether or not there is sub-
stantial evidence supporting the Finding of Fa·ct here-
inafter quoted. Harris v. Entler, supra. Finding of Fact 
No. \:lis as follows: 
"That shortly after the 16th day of N ove1nber, 
1940 and before the first day of January, 1941, 
the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, received notice and 
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings 
filed by the defen'dant, L. H. Heiselt; that the 
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plaintiff, A. E. Upton, 'vas represented hy coun-
sel, Raphael J. Moses, at the first n1eeting .of 
creditors held on ApTil 29, 1941; that the plain-
tiff, A. E. U p·ton, again received notic~ and. actual 
knowledge of said bankruptcy pToceed1ngs 1n May 
and June of 1941; that he received notice and ac-
tual knowledge of the said bankruptcy proceed-
ings in ample time to avail hilnself of the benefits 
of the banruptcy law and in ample time to give 
him an equal opportunity with other creditors." 
From the general circu1nstance surrounding the re-
lationship between decedent Heiselt and plaintiff and 
plaintiff's bank, it is just inconceivable that plaintiff 
would not have had actual notice of the decedent's bank-
ruptcy p,roceeding. 
Starting in 1936 and up until he went to California 
in J 1anuary, 1941, plaintiff was actively overseeing and 
watching the loans made to Heiselt Construction Com-
pany and to Mr. Heiselt (Ex. 4-A, p. 10). He talked 
with 1\lr. Heiselt on numerous occasions concerning this 
delinquency right up until he left in January, 1941 (Ex. 
4-A, p. 12). 1\;lr. Heiselt never came to Denver without 
seeing plaintiff and talking with him (Ex. 4-A, p. 21). 
Directors' n1eetings were held at least once a n1onth 
by the bank (Ex. 6-A, p. 5). The bank \vas given notice of 
the bankruptcy proceedings and the proceedings \vere 
discussed in the directors' 1neetings (Ex. 6-A, p. 6). 
vVhen the notice was receive1d Ernest Upton obtained the 
record of all cla.in1s scheduled (Ex. 6-A, p. 6). 
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vVhen plaintiff left for Palo Alto he turned these 
affairs over to his brother (Ex. 4-A, p. 13). Upon his re-
turn he naturally was interested in the progress of these 
loans and \vas infor1ned concerning their status (Ex. 4-A, 
p. 14). 
The depositions disclose that on at least three speci-
fic occasions plaintiff received actual kno,vledge of the 
proceedings in bankruptcy. First, he received notice 
~hortly after plaintiff's bank received notice of the claim 
'vhich -vvould be prior to January 1, 1941. Second, plain-
tiff received further notice someti1ne during ~fay or June 
of 1941, subsequent to the return of plaintiff from Palo 
..~.\Ito. Third, plaintiff was representeld by counsel ·at the 
first 1neeting of creditors held April 29, 1941. 
The deposition of Ernest B. Upton establishes notice 
to plaintiff very soon after receipt of notice by the bank. 
The petition in bankruptcy and his schedule of debts were 
filed by 1\Ir. Heiselt October 23, 1940 (Ex. 1-A), and no"-
tice of the first meeting of creditors \vas mailed N ovem-
ber 14, 1940. It appears from the deposition of R.aphael 
,J. :\Ioses that these notices were in the hands of credi-
tors at least by November 20, 19·40, because he, as an at-
torney for one of the creditors, had received this notice 
by that tiine (Ex. 5-A, p. 3). A conference was held with 
l.loses on November 22, 1940 concerning deceldent's bank-
ruptcy (Ex. 5-A, p. 3). 
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At pages 6 and 7 of his deposition (Ex. 6-A) 1\lr. 
Ernest Upton testified as follows: 
"Q. Well, do you recall the time that the 
'bank received notice that Mr. Heiselt was in 
bankruptcy~ 
''A. Yes, I knew about that. 
"Q. And do you recall when you first learned 
of it~ 
"A. I couldn't now, personally. 
"Q. You were consulted about filing the 
claim, were you not~ 
"A. Certainly. 
"Q. And did you prepare the claim as the 
attorney for the bank~ 
''A. I presume I did. I can't tell you defi-
nitely, right now. I have no copy of it in the files. 
"Q. Did you discuss that matter with your 
brother~ 
"A. I ,don't recall any specific discussions 
but of course it was all under discussion by the 
bank in the bank meetings. 
"Q. The matter of 1\{r. Heiselt's bankruptcy 
was discussed in those meetings~ 
"A. Yes, oh, yes. 
"Q. And of course the bank was vitallv inter-
ested in this $12,000 loan~ of 
''A. Certainly, as the hank itself got a notice 
of it, a~d I went over to the bankruptcy court and 
got their record of the claims "\Vhich J\;fr. Heiselt 
set up in his bankruptcy. 
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"Q. And amongst those you knew that there 
'vas a claim of $30; that is, that Mr. Heiselt sched-
uled a debt of $30 owed by him to your brother 
_._>\. E. Upton~ 
"A. Oh, yes, I saw that in the schedule. 
"Q. Did you talk with Mr. Upton, your 
brother, about that~ 
"A. I a1n sure that I told him about it. 
"Q. And do you recall when~ 
"A. Well, that would be following the tin1e 
that I went over and got the list of the claims. 
"Q. Do you remember when you did that~ 
"A. I couldn't give you the date, no, but that 
\Vas after his listing was filed over there, and I 
specifically went over there to see if the bank 
claim \vas filed, which it was." 
.. A_ t page 14 he gave further details of this notifica-
tion \vhen he testified as follows: 
"Q. When you called to Mr. A. E. Upton's 
attention the scheduling of his debt, \vhat did he 
say~ 
"MR. CHRISTENS-EN: Are you talking 
about the $30 ~ 
"MR. R~OBERTS: The $30 debt, yes. 
"A. What he actually did say, it was some-
thing more or less to the effect that it was a joke. 
He said, 'He owes me a lot more than that.' " 
Plaintiff also received notice of the proceedings 
shortly after his return fron1 Palo Alto. It is clear that 
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plain tiff was handling the policy tna.tters relating to Hei-
selt Construction Company and Heiselt loans 1nade by the 
bank. He would be vitally concerned with any proceed-
ings had in relation to these obligations. 
Plaintiff testified concerning his triv to P~alo Alto 
as follows (Ex. 4-A, p. 8): 
8) : 
"Q. When did you leave Denver to go to 
Palo Alto-about~ 
"A. I would say about in the n1onth of Jan-
uary. 
"Q. What year~ 
"A. 1941." 
Plaintiff testified about his return to Denver (page 
"Q. And you stayed in Palo Alto until when°? 
''A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
I re1nained there until just in time to get hack here 
by the 1st of May. 
"Q. May~ 
. "A. Yes-wait a minute-no, no; I just can't 
g1ve the date; I know that I was in Denver the 
28th of May. I h·ave definite knowledge of that 
by reason of having issued a check here to send 
out there for $225, to my wife." 
Concerning his receipt of knowledge of the proceed-
ings after his return he testified (pages 14, 15): 
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'"Q. When you came back you, of course, 
again talked over the things which you had been 
handling for the bank before you left~ 
"A. There was nothing to talk over in the 
n1atter of the Heiselt case because that was settled 
'vhile I w·as gone. It was filed in bankruptcy 
court, as I recall. 
"Q. And you learned about that when you 
got back~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And who discussed 'vith you that fact, 
do you recall~ 
"A. Well, if there wa.s any discussion about 
it, I would say it would be E. B. Upton. 
* * * * 
''Q. But when you returned here from Palo 
..~.-\Ito they discussed that matter with you and told 
you about it~ 
"A. There w·as no discussion about it; there 
'vas no occasion for discussion. 
''Q. Well, they told you about it~ 
"A. They told me what they had done. 
"Q. Tha.t they had gone down to Ala1nosa 
to check into this bankruptcy matter of Mr. Hei-
selt 'sand to present this claim~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And they told you that im1nediately up-
on your return~ 
"A. No, I wouldn't say in1mediately. They 
n1·ay have told me the first day I was here and they 
may not have told me for a month. 
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"Q. But it would be within a month after 
your return~ 
"A. Not necessarily. It would be if the 
occasion arose for the matter to be brought up." 
Because of the length of time, plaintiff refused to 
attempt to specify any particular date as to when he 
he·ard of this matter, but board meetings were held once 
a month (Ex. 4-A, p. 16), and concerning this he said 
(page 17): 
"Q. You knevv they told you in this board 
meeting, or it came up, that they vvent down and 
presented this claim~ 
"A. That's right, they gave 1ne this inforina-
tion. 
"Q. And that they had presented it in this 
bankruptcy mat·ter at Alamos~a ~ 
"A. Yes." 
Ernest B. Upton testified that he made the trip to Ala-
mosa on a Sunday and the hearing was on ~fay 5, 1941. 
On this occasion they filed the proof of clain1 in behalf 
of the bank (Ex. 6-A, pp. 7, 8). l\fr. Ernest B. Upton testi-
fied ('pages 16, 17) : 
"Q. Is it your recollection that it was shortly 
after he got back that the n1a.tter of Heisel t was 
discussed with hiln ~ The proceedings in Ala1nosa. 
''A. I haven't said they were discussed. They 
would be rep·orted to him-app·roval of the claim 
and the amount woul~ be reported, and of course 
Mr. Land, vvho was With me a.nd the witness had 
' 
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\Yith hin1 the bank record and knew it all and was 
there all the time-probably he told A. E. before 
I did. 
~'Q. But you recall telling hiln1 
"A. No. 
"Q. , ... ou recall reporting it at a board of 
directors meeting~ 
"A. I wouldn't say I reported it; I would say 
it 'vas discussed there. It, naturally, would be. 
"Q. And in the presence of J\1:r. A. E. Upton~ 
"A. He vvas there, yes." 
The third notice clai1ned is that Raphael J. Moses 
represented plaintiff at the creditors' n1eeting of Ap-ril 
:29, 1941. The records of the bankruptcy court, intro'duced 
in evidence, indicate that he represented plaintiff (Ex. 
7-"'\). lie testified that certainly the records \Vould not be 
in error (Ex. 5-A, p. 7). He testified (Ex. 5-A, p. 3) : 
"* * * so far as the authority for entering the 
appearance of National City Bank and A. E. Up-
ton, I have no direct recollection, but I am con-
vinced in rny own mind that that authority arose 
either out of correspondence which has since been 
destroyed, or out of this meeting in Denver on No-
vember 22nd, as it has never been our practice to 
enter any appearance 'vithout some authority to 
do so." 
His best recollection was that he 1net in Denver with 
~[r. Ernest B. T~ pton on November 22, 1940 (Ex. 5-A, p. 
3). He further testified that he "\vould have no other 
cause to consult \Yith }f r. Ernest B. l~ pton other than in 
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connection \vith these bankruptcy proceedings. Plain-
tiff acknowledged that Ernest B. lTpton was his princi-
pal attorney when he testified as follows (Ex. -1-A, p. 
13): 
"Q. Was he your personal attorney during 
that p·eriod of time, 1940 and '41 ~ 
. "A. Well, in a sense he has been 1ny princi-
pal attorney ever since he has been practicing la\v 
in Denver." 
We submit fron1 all these circumstances the proba-
bilities are that ~Ir. :1Ioses 'vas authorized to represent 
plaintiff at the creditors' meeting in April, 1941. It is 
very unlikely that an attorney would 1na.ke an unauthor-
ized ap·pearance in a matter such as this. Certainly it 
should take more than the testimony of the U ptons to 
upset the circumstances detailed above, and it certainly 
indicated that :1\tfr. Moses was representing both the bank 
and plaintiff in these proceedings under authority law-
fully granted. 
This judicia.! record (Ex. 7 -A), solemnly made over 
thirteen years ago, is substantial evidence that plaintiff 
was repTesented at the first creditors' 1neeting and sup-
ports the finding n1ade by the trial court to that effect. 
Ernest Upton even denied that he had taken step~ 
to have the bank represented at th·e first meeting of 
creditors (Ex. 6-A, p·. 10). This was a $12,000 claim and 
it vvould he very tmlikely that the bank would p-ermit its 
interest to go unrepresente'd ;at this first 1neeting. The 
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only person representing the bank \vas l\Ir. Moses. We 
~ub1nit that this testi1nony by Ernest Upton casts serious 
doubts upon his credibility or his memory. 
l~laintiff's credibility \VaS also dirninished \Vhen he 
atternpted on direct examination to claim his first knowl-
edge of Heiselt's bankruptcy was sometime in 1947, when 
he n1ade formal appearance in the proceedings repre-
sented hy attorney Hudson (Ex. 4-A, pp. 4, 5). 
The 1Ttah case of Harris v. Entler, supra, is closely 
1n point. The debt \Vas not scheduled. The court held 
it released because the creditor had knowledge of the 
proceedings. The evidence was in conflict on this propo-
~ition and the finding of kno\vledge was therefore sup-
ported. The court stated: 
"* * * This finding reads as f ollo\vs : ·That 
the defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt on De-
cember 3, 1929, and that the plaintiff had due and 
legal notice and actual knowledge of said bank-
ruptcy proceedings. That about February 27, 
1931, the defendant was granted a discharge fro1n 
all his debts and liabilities including the debt and 
liability on \vhich this action is brought.' 
"'It is conceded the debt sued upon was not 
listed in the bankruptcy proceeding. Defendant 
at the time did not recognize it as a debt. l-Ie kne\v 
the claim was made by plaintiff and should have 
listed it with a notation that the den1and was dis-
puted. Tyrrel v. Harnn1erstein, 33 ~fise. · 505, G7 
N.Y.S. 717. The court, however, found that plain-
tiff had notice and actual kno\vledge of the bank-
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ruptcy proceeding and that defen1dant "\vas dis-
charged fron1 all his debts and liabilities including 
the debt owing to plaintiff. The finding of actual 
knowledge is a finding of an ultimate fact and 
not a conclusion. It is supported by the testi1nony 
of defendant that plaintiff knew of the proceed-
ings in 1930, although such testimony was dis-
p·uted by plaintiff. The evi1dence being in conflict, 
the finding of the trial court must stand. 
"Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provide~ 
that: 'A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a 
bankrupt from all of his p,rovable debts, except 
such as * * * (third) ha.ve not been duly scheduled 
in ti1ne for p,roof and allowance, with th·e name 
of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless 
such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of 
the pToceedings in bankruptcy.' 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 
35; 3 R.C.L. 336." 
Plaintiff sp,eculates that his $30.00 debt 'vas not 
schelduled. It appea.rs on Exhibit 1-A. There is no eYi-
dence of any alteration of the record and 11oses testified: 
"I believe it 1vas listed in his schedules which 
were filed with the Petition in Bankruptcy." (Ex. 
5-A, P'· 5) 
The authorities first cited under this point teach 
that actual knovvledge n1ay come to the creditor in an 
inforn1al manner and need not be direct fron1 th.e debtor 
or the court. 
The proof of knowledge need not be by direct and 
specific notice. No different rule should be applied here 
than to other civil or criminal cases. Circumstantial evi-
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dence is as potent here as in other fields of the law. In 
this case there is testirnony that the decedent's proceed-
ings in bankruptcy were brought to plaintiff's attention 
by his brother and in hank directors' meetings. Thirteen 
year~ later no ·w·itness would specifically say the exact 
date or tin1e this "\vas done. This does not mean that 
the trier of fact 1nnst throw up his hands and say legally 
it cannot be deter1nined. \Vhat are the probabilities~ 
Bankruptcy "~as filed October 23, 1940. A schedule of 
debts \Yas filed. Notice \Yas sent to plaintiff's bank at 
least by N ove1nber 20, 1940. Plaintiff's brother checked 
the schedules to see if the bank's clain1 \Vas scheduled. He 
found it \Yas and also one of plaintiff's claims scheduled. 
He told plaintiff about it and the bank's claim. Would 
it be reasonable to suppose that this subject was dis-
cussed and con1n1ented upon seven or eight months after 
the event \Yhen plaintiff in November and December of 
1940, and at least part of J'anuary, 1941, was actively 
\vatching the Heiselt transactions~ This should be, and 
\ve sub1nit is, sufficient to support a finding that plain-
tiff acquired knowledge within the months of N overnber 
and Decen1ber, 1940 and January, 19"41. 
This same arguine·nt applies to the occasion after 
plaintiff's return in May, 1941. He was again notified 
after his return of the bankruptcy proceedings. He ar-
rived sometime prior to May 28, because on that day he 
sent a check from Denver to his wife in California. \Vould 
it be reasonable to assume that the $12,000 IIeiselt clain1 
\\Thich he had been handling before his departure would 
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he left unnoticed for a n1onth after his return'? Would it 
not be reasonable to find that a.s soon a.s he returned one 
of his first inquiries would concern this clai1n ~ Certainly 
that is the probability and supports a finding that in the 
month of May he learned of these bankruptcy proceed-
ings and as found by the court in· time to avail himself 
of the benefit of the bankruptcy law and in ample ti1ne 
to afford him equal opportunities with the other credi-
tors. 
We submit that th·e Finding of Fact VI (70) is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED 
WAS A PROVABLE DEBT. 
Concededly under 11 U.S.C.A., 'Sec. 35 a debt to be 
released by discharge in bankruptcy must be a provable 
debt. 11 U.S.C.A., Sec. 103 sets forth debts which are 
provable. 
The typ,e of debt upon which the judgment is based 
clearly a:p,p.ears from the case of Upton v. Heiselt Const. 
Co., 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945. It appears that 1\fr. Hei-
selt was the endorser of a note signed by the Heiselt Con-
struction Coinpany as Inaker. That endorselnent pro-
vided: 
"'I "th , we or ei. e~ of us, hereby guarantee the 
payment of the Within note, 'va.iving demand pre-
sentment for paJinent notice of dishonor p;otest 
d . ' ' an notice of protest. * ** '" 
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)[a~" 15, 1937. Hence, at the time that the proceedings 
in bankruptey were con11nenced this debt was long past 
due and ~Ir. Heiselt's liability thereon \vas fixed. 
Section 103 supra, so far as Inaterial, provides : 
'" (a) Debts of the bankrupt 1nay be proved 
and allo\ved against his estate \Yhich are founded 
upon (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judg-
Inent or an instrument in \Vriting, absolutely ow-
ing at the ti1ne of the filing of the petition by or 
against him, whether then payable or not, with any 
interest thereon which would have been recover-
able at that date or \vith a rebate of interest upon 
such as were not then paya;ble and did not bear 
interest; * * * ." 
* * * * 
" ( -±) an open account, or a contract express 
or implied; ( 5) provable debts reduced to judg-
Inents after the filing of the petition and before 
the consideration of the bankrupt's application 
for a discharge, less costs incurred and interest 
accrued after the filing of the petition and up to 
the time of the entry of such judgments; * * * 
* * * * 
"(8) contingent debts and contingent con-
tractualliabilities; * * * .'' 
Subdivision (8) above was added by an amendment 
1n 1938. Even before the inclusion of that subdivision 
liability of an endorser was held a provable debt in M a.y-
uard v. Elliott, 283 lT.S. 27:1, 51 S. Ct. 390, 392, 75 ].;. Ed. 
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1028 ( 1931). The principal debt \Yas not due at the tin1e 
the petition in bankruptcy \YaS filed. rrhe trustee ('Oil-
tended that liability as an endorser \vas not a prova:blP 
debt in bankruptcy. The Supre1ne Court in holding to the 
contrary stated: 
"But the liability of an indorser is of neifher 
class. Its an1ount is certain; and the contingeney 
of notice of dishonor to the indorser is within the 
control of the creditor, so as to place his clai1n, so 
far as its certainty of accrual and its susceptibility 
of liquidation are concerned, up·on the same foot-
ing as the contract of indemnity which was held 
provable in Williams v. U.S. Fidelity Co., supra, 
although the clairnant had done nothing at the 
time of the bankruptcy to satisfy the liability for 
which the indemnity was given. See also Central 
Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, supra, pages 
593, 594 of 240 U.S., 36 S. Ct. 412. 
"The claim against the indorser of paper not 
matured at the time of the bankruptcy thus stands 
on the same plane as contracts of suretyship or 
guarantee of payment of a debt not due until after 
the bankruptcy. See In re Lyons Beet Sugar 
Refining Co., supra; Collier on Bankruptcy, su-
pra; Remington on Bankruptcy, supra. Even 
though not due until after the year allowed for 
proof of claims, if proved in time, such a claim 
may he liquidated a.s are other unmatured claims. 
In re Buzzini, sup~ra, page 830 of 183 F·. As the 
claim is provable, and as notice of dishonor after 
the petition is filed is necessary only to charge 
the indorser, in the event he does not secure his 
discharge, the claimant need not give notice of 
dishonor in order to share in the estate. ·see Col-
Inan Co. v. Withoft, supra, page 253 of 195 F." 
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Plaintiff's contention is that the endorsers liability 
on a note secured by n1ortgage is "too contingent." Suf-
fice it to say subdivision 8 specifies all contingent debts, 
and hence 1nust cover this "contingent" debt. 
In re I.~ehrenkranss, 14 Fed. Supp. G82, cited by plain-
tiff, \Vas decided in 1936 before the addition of subdi-
vision (8). 
In any event the court concedes that if the person 
guaranteed \Vas in default at the time of bankruptcy it 
\\~ould be provable. There the principal \vas not in default 
and no suit could be brought. Flere the principal was in 
default at the tin1e of bankruptcy and suit against him 
'"·ould not be preinature. 
Peterson v. Johnson N,ul Co., 204 ~finn. 300, 283 N.W. 
;)Ill, \vas an action to enjoin defendant fron1 competing 
\\~ith plaintiff in the business of selling nuts in certain 
areas. This could hardly be in point here. 
\V e subn1it that the debt at the tin1e decedent filed 
for bankruptcy was a provable debt within the bank-
ruptcy statutes and hence dischargeable. 
CONCI.JUSION 
We respectfully subn1it that the debt and the judg-
Inent into which it n1erged were discharged in bankruptcy 
because plaintiff had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy 
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proceedings and '"as represented therein. The District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County is a court of general jurisdiction and had juris-
diction to hear and determine the proposition of whether 
or not the judgment rendered by the Utah court had 
been discharged in bankruptcy. The debt, under the 1938 
A1nendment to the Bankruptcy Act, although contingent, 
was a provable debt. The proceedings here instituted 
by decedent and the defendant administratrix were the 
first and only proceedings wherein a court has been asked 
to deter1nine the question of discharge of this debt in 
bankruptcy. 
We respe:ctfully submit that the judg1nent of the 
trial court should be affirn1ed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBER.TS 
& BLACK 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Counsel for Respondent, Annie Ray 
Heiselt, Administratrix of the Estate 
of L. H. Heiselt, Deceased 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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